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Abstract 
 
In spite of the critical role of transaction cost, there are not many papers that explicitly 
examine its influence on international equity portfolio allocation decisions. Using bilateral 
cross-country equity portfolio investment data and three direct measures of transaction costs 
for 36 countries, we provide evidence that markets where transaction costs are lower attract 
greater equity portfolio investments. The results imply that future research on international 
equity portfolio diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction costs, and 
policy makers, especially in emerging markets, will have to reduce transaction costs to attract 
higher levels of foreign equity portfolio investments.  
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1. Introduction 
There is extensive research documenting the gains from the diversification of domestic 
portfolios internationally. Grubel’s (1968) study is accredited as the first to suggest that by 
including foreign securities, investors are able to achieve a lower variance in returns from the 
internationally diversified portfolio because of the less than perfect correlations amongst 
different stock markets around the world. Subsequent research by Solnik (1974) and more 
recently by Driessen and Laeven (2007) support the view that diversifying internationally 
helps in improving a portfolio’s risk/reward ratio. Although Jorion (1985) challenges the ex 
post gains reported by earlier studies, Eun and Resnick (1988) find that, even after controlling 
for exchange risk, an internationally diversified portfolio significantly outperforms a portfolio 
that is invested in only US securities. 
 
However, in spite of the overwhelming evidence on the gains from diversifying 
internationally, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) show that investors tend to invest a 
disproportionately high share in domestic assets. In the literature, the tendency of investors to 
invest a greater proportion of a portfolio in domestic securities is commonly known as home 
bias. More recently, Chan et al. (2005) investigate the factors which determine international 
asset allocations and find that mutual funds demonstrate foreign bias by underweighting and 
overweighting foreign markets. Further, Gelos and Wei (2005) show that international 
investment funds display wide variations in allocating weights to foreign markets based on 
the level of a country’s transparency. Evidence of home bias and foreign bias provided by 
previous research thus far suggests that there are several direct and indirect barriers to 
international investments. These barriers arise, for instance, from discriminatory taxes, 
different legal status accorded to foreign investors in terms of ownership restrictions, 
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differences in accounting and information disclosure standards and investor protection 
regulations, capital controls and transaction costs.
1
  
 
The consumption and portfolio choice model developed by Rowland (1999) shows that as 
the magnitude of transaction cost increases, the rate of portfolio diversification decreases. 
This implies that despite the well known benefits of international diversification, investors 
may underweight those countries where the transaction costs are high. Of course, the 
investor’s decision to allocate a greater proportion of capital to domestic securities may be 
influenced by home bias as they may feel that they are informationally disadvantaged while 
investing in foreign markets. However, if we control for home bias as well as for factors that 
have been found important in international diversification literature, we should be able to 
demonstrate whether transaction costs significantly influence the international equity 
portfolio allocations. By using a comprehensive dataset of bilateral cross-country foreign 
equity portfolio holdings and four different measures of transaction costs for 36 countries, 
this paper examines whether different components of transaction cost significantly influence 
international investors’ decisions to underweight or overweight country allocations.   
 
The role and importance of transaction cost in investments is not trivial. Keim and 
Madhavan (1995) suggest that transaction costs are important in determining investment 
performance and may significantly diminish or possibly outweigh the expected value 
generated by an otherwise good investment strategy. Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) 
suggest that assets with high transaction costs usually trade at a lower price relative to their 
expected cash flows. Similarly, Green et al. (2000) using a long dataset on the UK stock 
                                                 
1
 Bekaert and Harvey (2003) suggest that despite liberalization of financial markets, there are 
still many barriers to investing internationally.  
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market suggest that the increase in transaction costs also generally increases market volatility, 
which is probably through the thin trading effect. They suggest that emerging markets must 
get the level of transaction cost right in order to influence their market volatility. Further, 
they note that emerging markets should not only focus on stamp duty but must also 
concentrate on other forms of transaction cost. De Roon et al. (2001) find that for US 
investors investing in emerging markets, the diversification benefits disappear when short 
selling and transaction costs are incorporated. Solnik and McLeavey (2004) note that the 
impact of transaction costs is often disregarded in active global portfolio management and to 
the extent diversification benefits may reduce portfolio risk; the incorporation of transaction 
costs could reduce the expected returns. 
 
In spite of the critical role of transaction cost acknowledged by previous studies, very few 
examine its influence on international portfolio investment decisions. Chan et al. (2005) use 
the transaction cost data of Elkins/McSherry Co. in examining how mutual funds of 26 
developed and developing countries allocate their investment between domestic and foreign 
equity markets. However, they do not analyse the impact of each component (i.e., 
commission, fees, and market impact) that make up the Elkins/McSherry Co. transaction cost 
measure. Gelos and Wei (2005) merely control for transaction cost by using average turnover 
ratio as a proxy in examining how their newly constructed measures of transparency affect 
the investment choices of the emerging market equity funds. The apparent lack of research on 
the impact of transaction costs on international portfolio allocations is mainly due to the 
unavailability of cross-border bilateral portfolio holdings data on a country by country basis. 
In this research, we use bilateral country by country portfolio holdings data that have recently 
been made available by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and provide evidence of the 
extent to which portfolio allocation choices are influenced by transaction costs. 
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Our study makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. First, while 
controlling for the home bias phenomenon we examine the role of transaction costs in 
demonstrating why certain countries receive higher or lower levels of foreign equity portfolio 
allocations than others. Second, unlike previous studies on international portfolio allocations, 
we control for market microstructure effects by capturing the rate of information flow and 
industrial diversity of the equity markets. Existing research ignores the role of real effective 
exchange rates on portfolio investment decisions. In this study, instead of using a bilateral 
effective exchange rate, we use a broad based trade weighted real effective exchange rate 
which is a much better measure of exchange rate risk. Third, we use an extensive dataset 
comprising bilateral portfolio holdings for 36 developed and developing countries over a 
recent time period of 2001 to 2006 with 562 bilateral cross-sectional units and 3290 
observations which enable us to comprehensively examine our research hypotheses. Finally, 
in contrast to most previous studies that use a cross-sectional approach, we test our 
hypotheses robustly by using random and fixed effect models within a panel-data framework. 
 
The results show that all three direct measures of transaction cost (commission, fees and 
market impact) distinctly and significantly affect investment allocation choices, and that 
countries with lower transaction costs seem to attract greater foreign equity portfolio 
investment. There are two important implications of this result. First, future research on 
international portfolio diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction cost in 
country allocation decisions. Second, national policy makers should aim to reduce transaction 
costs to attract higher levels of foreign equity portfolio investments.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the theoretical 
framework that provides a basis for our empirical work. Section three explains the data, 
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various controlling variables and methodology used in this study. Section four presents and 
discusses the results of panel data analysis and section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Barriers to bilateral cross country equity investments: Theoretical framework 
An alternative approach to optimize the country allocation could be based on net equity 
returns which largely depend on the trading frequency and whether trading costs are stable 
over time.
2
 However, this is not a realistic assumption as the transaction costs would vary 
significantly over the sample period of six years (2001-2006) used in this paper. For example 
in the case of Malaysia, we find that there is a considerable temporal variation in transaction 
costs and these appear to reduce over time.  
 
We use the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) which suggests that in 
the presence of deadweight costs international investors do not hold the world market 
portfolio as is assumed in the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). In the 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) model, each investor is assumed to be a mean-variance risk-
averse investor who is interested in maximizing returns for a given level of variance. 
Therefore, the optimization problem is described as:  
 
subject to 
  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
2
 We thank the anonymous referee for this point. Chan et al. (2005) assume that transaction 
costs remain stable over time. However, such an assumption is only valid where cross-
sectional data analysis is used. We do not report data showing temporal variations in 
transaction costs but these can be made available on request. 
  (1)  
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where wi is a column vector of foreign portfolio weights whereby the jth element corresponds 
to the weight of individual i’s total wealth invested in risky assets of country j. R denotes the 
column vector of pre-tax expected returns and ci is the column vector of the deadweight cost 
of investor i. The jth element of ci is cij which is the deadweight cost for holding the asset in 
country j. V is the variance/covariance matrix of the gross (pre-cost, pre-tax) returns on the 
risky assets with v being the constant variance and I is a unity column vector. The objective 
of the investor is to optimize equation (1) given the two constraints. Equation (1) can be 
maximized using the Lagrange method: 
 
 
where h and k are the Lagrange multipliers. In order to maximize our objective function in 
equation (1), we need to set its derivative to zero and solve to get 
 
 
 
Hence, the optimal portfolio for investor i is  
 
where  
 
 
Now that we have got the individual weights, the latter can be aggregated to arrive at the 
world capital market equilibrium. Therefore the market clearing condition is 
 
  (2)  
  (3)  
  (4)  
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where Pi is the proportion of total world wealth owned by country i, M  is a column with the 
corresponding ith element of which Mi is the proportion of the world market capitalization in 
country i’s market. Substituting equation (4) in equation (5) and subtracting the subsequent 
equation from equation (3), we get rid of R. Defining z as the minimum variance portfolio 
 we can obtain 
 
 
If there are no barriers to investing in a foreign or domestic country, then the deadweight 
costs (cij) are zero for all i and j. In such a case, the right hand side of (6) is zero. This implies 
that all investors should hold the world market portfolio. Let us consider a case where the 
covariance matrix, V, is diagonal with all variances equal to s
2
 and the deadweight cost of any 
country/investor pair is denoted by c, except for the domestic country which is equal to zero. 
In such a case, the portfolio holdings of investor i in country j are 
 
 
Equation (7) implies that the larger the deadweight cost, c, the greater should be the 
deviation of actual portfolio holdings from the world market portfolio. This deviation is 
negative for foreign investment and positive for the domestic country. The following 
equations translate the relationship with the objective of assessing the case where the 
deadweight costs are non-uniform. 
  (5)  
  (6)  
 
 
 
 (7)  
  (8)  
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where 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ai is implied as the weighted average marginal deadweight cost for investor i, bj as the 
weighted marginal deadweight cost for investors investing in country j and d the world 
weighted average marginal cost. 
 
The above relationship suggests that if the marginal deadweight cost, cij, is large relative to 
the weighted average marginal deadweight cost for investor i, ai, or the weighted average 
marginal deadweight cost for investors investing in country j, bj, it is highly likely that the 
right hand side of equation (8) will be negative, suggesting that investor i should underweight 
in assets of country j relative to its weight in the world market portfolio. Similarly, as there 
are no barriers to investing in the domestic country, the right-hand side of equation (9) should 
be positive and investors should overweight home securities relative to the domestic 
proportion of their world market portfolio.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, the bilateral foreign portfolio allocation should depend 
on the difference between the cost for investor i investing in country j (cij) and the weighted 
average cost for investing in country j (bj). This suggests that that if cij is greater than bj, 
investor i should underweight country j. 
 
 
   (9)  
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3. Data and methodology 
This paper uses bilateral foreign equity portfolio investment holdings data, three direct 
measures of transaction cost, turnover ratio as an indirect measure of transaction cost, and a 
host of controlling variables that have been shown to be relevant in international portfolio 
allocations by previous literature. The following section describes the data used in this study.  
 
3.1. The dependent and independent variables 
Following Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), we model the portfolio weights as our dependent 
variable revealed in the data.
3
 The allocation weight of portfolio holdings of country i into 
country j is defined as 
 
where wijt is the weight of foreign equity investment (stock of holdings) from country i into 
country j for the year t and FPIijt is the actual foreign equity portfolio investment in USD 
million.
4
 Bilateral investment holdings data are obtained from IMF website. In October 1997 
the IMF undertook a Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of 29 participating 
countries and began to annually report portfolio holdings on a bilateral country basis since 
                                                 
3
 We also use a proxy for portfolio flows calculated by taking the first differences of portfolio 
holdings. We find that none of the regression specifications using flow proxy fit the model 
adequately as the maximum overall R
2
 obtained is around 9%. Results are not reported here 
but could be obtained from the authors on request. Further, our decision to use holdings data 
is justified since Fidora et al. (2007) suggest that the proxy portfolio flows constructed by 
taking the first difference of the holdings data do not fully reflect actual portfolio flows as the 
change may be caused by changes in valuation of  holdings over time.  
 
4
 We also denominate the holdings in investor country’s currency but as the results are 
virtually unchanged we do not report these regression results. 
 
  (10)  
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2001.
5
 The prime motive of the survey is to have better understanding of the global 
asymmetries in the reported balance of payment data, particularly those in portfolio 
investments. All participating countries are required to report a breakdown of their stock of 
portfolio investments, including portfolio equity investment holdings by the country of 
residency of the non-resident issuer. The IMF website provides detailed data on a country by 
country basis. Although data are available from 1997, complete data for all countries are 
available only from 2001 onwards. Since in the majority of cases, investments originate from 
developed countries, we consider portfolio weights from the point of view of investors based 
in developed countries such as the US. Fidora et al. (2007), who also use the same dataset for 
home bias issues, note that investment from developing countries into developed countries is 
almost negligible and mostly not reported by IMF. Further, the selection of 16 investor 
countries and 36 target countries is dictated by data availability. The trading cost data for 36 
countries we use in this study are handpicked from Standard and Poor’s Global Stock 
Markets Factbook.
6
  
 
In our analysis, the independent variables are the four different measures of transaction 
cost in country j at time t. This includes three measures of trading cost maintained by 
Elkins/McSherry (E/M) and reported in the Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Markets 
Factbook. E/M analyzes trading costs for 150 global institutions such as pension funds, 
                                                 
5
 The survey includes the financial market participants, the primary end-investors (e.g. banks, 
security dealers, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, non financial 
corporations, households), and primary custodians, who hold or manage securities on behalf 
of others. Some caveats deserve mention. Any investment below USD 500,000 is not 
reported. Also, some data may not be reported by a country due to confidentiality reasons. 
 
6
 Following Fidora et al. (2007), we also do not include offshore financial centres 
(Luxembourg and others) as recipient countries because of third-country holdings and round-
tripping issues. For example, for the year 2003 the total holding reported by German 
investors alone in Luxembourg was USD 152 billion whereas Luxembourg’s total market 
capitalization was less than USD 40 million. 
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investment managers, banks and brokers and their measures comprise three components. The 
first is the average commission paid (TC1). According to Solnik and McLeavey (2004) this 
represents commission paid to the brokers for allowing access to brokerage services and 
research resources. The second is the average fee (TC2) which includes costs incurred for 
obtaining additional services such as the post-trade settlement. It is worth mentioning that for 
the UK, the buying fee is significantly higher because of the stamp duty. We have taken 
average of buy and sell costs as investors pay more for buying but are compensated by paying 
significantly less for selling.  
 
The third measure is the average cost of market impact (TC3). The Standard and Poor’s 
Global Stock Markets Factbook defines market impact as the difference between the price at 
which a trade is executed and the average of the stock’s high, low, opening and closing prices 
during the trade. More precisely, it is the average cost of trade versus the average price. 
Market impact is hence defined as the difference between the actual execution cost and the 
price that would have been availed had the investor not been involved in the trading. All three 
costs are denominated in basis points. Finally, following previous literature, we use turnover 
ratio (TC4) as a proxy measure of transaction cost. The turnover ratio is the average value 
traded divided by average market capitalization. This measure indicates the relative level of 
liquidity and, following Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the turnover ratio is expected to be 
negatively related to transaction costs. The turnover data have been collected from annual 
issues of Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook. 
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3.2. Control variables 
We have used a number of control variables.
7
 The first is to control for the home bias 
phenomenon. French and Porteba (1991), and more recently Karlsson and Nordén (2007), 
show that despite the risk reduction benefits that foreign securities offer, investors tend to 
overweight domestic securities.  Chan et al. (2005) note that if foreign investors exhibit home 
bias and overweight their domestic market, the allocation to foreign markets would be 
disproportionately lower. Following Fidora et al. (2007), we construct the measure of 
bilateral home bias (HBIASijt) as follows:  
 
 
where HBIASijt is bilateral home bias observed by the host or investor country i for country j 
at time t.  BWTjt is defined as the benchmark weight and is computed as  
 
 
where MCjt is the market capitalization of the issuer j country at time t.  
 
The second control variable we use is the investor protection measure. Aggarwal et al. 
(2005) suggest that the US funds tend to invest in open market economies where stronger 
shareholders’ rights and legal frameworks are present. We use the investor profile measure 
provided by the ICRG Political Risk Services Group as a proxy for the quality of investor 
                                                 
7
 However, we do not include withholding taxes following French and Poterba (1991) who 
show that there is no significant relationship between taxes and international investment.  
 
  (11)  
  (12)  
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protection available in each country. The investor profile measure is constructed on a scale of 
0 to 12 and reflects government’s attitude towards inward investment. The investor profile 
measure is further divided into three sub-components: (i) contract viability or risk of 
expropriation, (ii) payment delays, and (iii) repatriation of profits. Each subcomponent is 
scored on a scale of 0 to 4 where 4 reflects a very low potential risk. This variable is expected 
to be positively related to portfolio weights as investors would prefer investing in those 
countries which provide better investor protection. La Porta et al. (1998) show that the 
English common law system provides better legal protection to shareholders compared to the 
German and French civil law systems. As an additional measure of investor protection, we 
use a legal dummy which takes a value of 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise. 
 
Further, we include two variables to control for economic development and economic 
growth. In order to control for the level of economic development we use the log value of per 
capita GDP denominated in USD. For economic growth, we use the GDP growth rate. Both 
variables are expected to show a positive relationship since investors should prefer to invest 
in countries that demonstrate higher economic development and growth. Data for both 
variables are obtained from world development indicator (WDI) of the World Bank. 
 
A commonly used proxy in the previous literature is the capital control intensity used by 
Edison and Warnok (2003). This measure is constructed by taking a ratio of market 
capitalization represented by S&P/IFC Investable Indices to the market capitalization of 
S&P/IFC Global Indices. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating completely open 
markets to foreign investors. Since these indices are mostly available for developing 
countries in the Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook and most developed 
markets have open economies, the ratios have been set to 1 for all developed countries. The 
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equity market openness variable also measures the time variation in the financial 
liberalization process and is expected to have a positive sign.
8
 
 
Following Dahlquist et al. (2003), since only a small portion of the market capitalization 
in most countries may be available to international investors, we use an additional proxy for 
capital control which is calculated as a percentage of closely held shares of the total market 
capitalization.  This measure is expected to capture the prevalence of closely held firms and 
expected to carry a negative coefficient. 
 
Chan et al. (2005) show that the level of stock market development affects international 
portfolio investments. We use the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as a measure of 
stock market development obtained from WDI. Additionally, we use cross-sectional standard 
deviation of stock returns (based on monthly data) for each country to control for market 
micro-structure effects. Ross (1989) models cross-sectional standard deviation as a direct 
measure for the rate of information flow which also reflects the diversity of the industrial 
sector. A low cross-sectional standard deviation would suggest that the economy is not well 
developed and industries represented on its stock market are not diversified. Following 
equation (4) in section 2, we expect this variable to be negatively correlated to international 
portfolio investments.  We also use an emerging market dummy to further control for the 
level of stock market development since it is well known that emerging markets are not as 
well developed as stock markets in developed countries.  
 
Foreign investors are generally concerned about exchange rate movements since they 
directly affect returns measured in domestic currencies. Therefore, foreign investors require a 
                                                 
8
  See De Jong and Roon (2005), Panchenko and Wu (2009) and Lagoarde-Segot (2009) 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
16 
 
currency risk premium for bearing systematic risk which they cannot diversify. In order to 
control for exchange rate risk, we use a three year moving average standard deviation of the 
trade weighted Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) sourced from the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS).  
 
Carrieri et al. (2006) note that it is more appealing to use REER than the nominal 
exchange rate because inflation rates are generally non-random and hence the nominal 
exchange rate may not reflect the true effect of exchange rate risk. Since the REER measure 
is based on the combined effect of changes in the inflation differential and changes in 
nominal currency value, it is a better measure because it captures the true effect of exchange 
rate risk arising from deviations from the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Further, Carrieri et 
al. (2006) provide evidence that the nominal exchange rate index may be confounded with 
other information and may not capture deviations from PPP or other factors.  Hence, by using 
the REER we are able to adjust the inflation rate differentials.
9
 The REER is calculated by 
adjusting the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) for the relative consumer prices levels. 
The BIS REER basket includes 52 economies, including the emerging countries. 
 
All control variables discussed so far are country specific variables. It is highly likely that 
international portfolio investments may be influenced by long term bilateral relationship, 
geographic proximity and market familiarity. In order to control for these factors, we employ 
a language dummy which takes the value of 1 if a pair country shares a common language. 
Similarly, we also add the log of the distance between capital cities of pair countries. Both 
these variables are obtained from the NBER website and have been used previously by 
                                                 
9
 Akram et al. (2009) demonstrate numerous economically significant violations of the law of 
one price. Although the use of REER could be justified in the light of the existing studies, we 
also use NEER calculated as the geometric weighted average of a basket of bilateral 
exchange rates. However, our results remain unchanged.  
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Subramanian and Wei (2007). The bilateral trade data are obtained from the Bilateral Trade 
Statistics of IMF and calculated by taking the log of total exports and imports of the pair 
country. The bilateral measure explained above captures the informational asymmetries that 
might exist between foreign and domestic investors. This may also help in predicting the 
probability of information flow as well as measuring the barriers that foreign investors 
encounter in seeking information overseas.  
 
It is widely known that greater portfolio diversification is achieved by adding foreign 
securities that have a lower return correlation with the returns from home securities (Solnik, 
1974). Thus to control for diversification potential between the pair countries, we use a 
correlation coefficient based on the six years’ monthly return data. We expect that lower 
correlations should positively influence international portfolio investments and vice versa. 
The final set of control variables we include are historical returns and country risk. We 
calculate the three year moving average of historical returns as it has been shown that 
investors prefer to invest in countries with higher historical returns. This investor tendency is 
commonly referred to in the literature as the return chasing hypothesis or feedback hypothesis 
(see Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Asem, 2009). We also include the composite country rating 
produced by the PRS group, popularly known as the  International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) rating which comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, 
and economic. A separate index is created for each of the subcategories. The Political Risk 
index is based on 100 points, Financial Risk index on 50 points, and Economic Risk index on 
50 points. The aggregate country risk is computed by multiplying the aggregate 200 points by 
0.5. 
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It is possible that our model may suffer from over-correction. For instance, the inclusion 
of bilateral variables and the equity market openness along with the bilateral home bias 
measure may cause the model to over-correct in controlling the bilateral and equity market 
openness as these variables are modelled against home bias in existing studies (see Fidora et 
al. 2007). When we run a simple regression to explain home bias using bilateral familiarity 
variables (trade, distance, language and correlation) and equity market openness, we find that 
all variables are statistically significant with an adjusted R
2
 of 20%.
10
 This shows that home 
bias captures a significant effect of these variables. In order to address this issue we follow 
the approach of Fama and French (1993) and orthogonalize these five variables (trade, 
distance, language, correlation and equity market openness) by deducting the fitted value 
from the home bias measure. This approach does not affect the coefficient and test-statistic 
for home bias and neither does it affect the relationship of transaction cost measures on any 
of the bilateral and equity openness variables. It simply orthogonalizes the effect of the 
bilateral variables from the home bias measure resolving the over-correction problem.  
Further, La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that investor protection is a major determinant of stock 
market development. As such, we run a simple regression of investor protection on stock 
market development and find that the coefficient for investor protection is 11.02 with a test-
statistic of 12.93, confirming the strong effect of investor protection on stock market 
development. Hence we orthogonalize the effect of investor protection from the stock market 
development measure.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
Our data include bilateral portfolio investments for 36 recipient countries and 16 investor 
countries over a period of six years (2001-2006)  providing us with a total of 562 cross-
                                                 
10
 The coefficients and their test-statistic are not reported here to save space but can be 
obtained from the authors on request. 
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section units and a total of 3290 observations. Not every regression uses all observations as 
for a few countries some variables are not available. For example, no bilateral trade data are 
available for Taiwan. Also, no transaction cost data are available for China, Poland and 
Russia.  
 
Given the wide cross-sectional differences and temporal variations, we employ panel data 
regression models using random and fixed effect estimations across different specifications. 
Since our analysis includes a number of dummies and rarely changing variables, this leaves 
us with little choice but to use the random effect model in most of our specifications. In our 
random effect models, although we are unable to control time invariant pair country effects, 
we are able to include all observed country specific and bilateral controls and the time 
dummies. Since the random effect model utilizes both ‘within’ and ‘between’ country 
variations, it is more efficient than the fixed effect model. However, since all our key 
variables are time varying, we also use the fixed effect model to control for unit specific 
effects. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
We first present the univariate average values of our dependent and independent variables. 
Although not as robust as panel regressions, univariate analysis does provide useful 
information.   
 
4.1. Statistics on portfolio weights and transaction costs 
Table 1 presents the averages of foreign equity portfolio investment and the transaction 
costs (in basis points) for all countries (j) for the entire sample period 2001-2006. It is worth 
noting from the figures in the second column that Peru receives the lowest average foreign 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
20 
 
equity portfolio allocation (0.02%), whereas the US receives the highest portfolio 
investments (37.76%).
11
 In terms of the top ten ranking, most countries are developed 
countries (US, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Finland and 
Canada). Eight out of the ten countries that received lowest international portfolio allocation 
are developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, 
Thailand and Turkey).  
 
(Insert Table “1” here) 
 
Columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 2 show the average of various components of transaction 
costs (i.e., commission, fees and market impact cost, respectively). Column 6 shows the total 
transaction costs (sum of commission, fees and market impact cost) and column 7 provides 
the average turnover ratio for each country (j). In terms of total cost (column 6), it is evident 
that Japan has the lowest total transaction cost followed by US, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. Not surprisingly, all of these 
countries are developed countries, although when turnover ratios are compared, the order 
alters a little. Developed countries still dominate the rankings with the exception of Korea, 
Taiwan and India. The univariate analysis provides prima facie evidence that generally lower 
transaction costs are associated with higher foreign portfolio allocations.  
 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between different components of transaction 
costs. Except for TC1 (commission) and TC2 (fees) that are somewhat correlated (0.40), 
other combinations have lower or negative correlations. Also, as expected, the turnover ratio 
                                                 
11
 Despite lower market capitalization of their equity markets, UK, France and Germany rank 
higher than Japan in terms of portfolio allocation for our sample period. We find that this is 
on account of home bias and other factors. For example, Japan has the highest home bias 
(1.47) compared to 0.49, 0.42 and 0.51 for France, Germany and UK respectively.  
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is negatively correlated with all other measures of transaction cost. This suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a significant problem among the various measures of transaction 
costs.  
(Insert Table “2” here) 
 
4.2. Regression analysis  
The univariate analysis of the summary statistics presented in previous sub-sections 
provides a good indication that countries with relatively lower transaction costs seem to 
attract higher equity portfolio allocation. To confirm this, we employ a number of regressions 
by including different variables that could potentially explain variations in portfolio 
allocations.
12
 All significant coefficients are shown with asterisks and the test-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis. Regression specification (13) includes the home bias (HBIAS) variable 
besides each of the different components of transaction cost (TC1, TC2, TC3 and TC4) as 
independent variables. The results of the regression are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
As expected HBIAS is highly significant and bears the expected negative sign. 
Estimations show that a 1% increase in home bias decreases bilateral portfolio holdings by 
nearly 1%. This finding is consistent with evidence provided by previous studies and 
confirms the existence of home bias in international portfolio allocations. However, after 
controlling for the home bias, all transaction cost measures are highly significant at the 5% 
level of significance.  
                                                 
12
 We also run regressions using bilateral 16 by 16 source-host countries (i.e. excluding the 
emerging markets) and find that our results are robust. To save space we do not report the 
results here but these can be obtained from the authors on request. 
 (13)  
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(Insert Table “3” here) 
 
The results presented in Table 3, however, may be biased since specification (13) excludes 
macroeconomic, institutional and bilateral control variables. Thus in regression (14), we 
include macroeconomic, institutional and bilateral variables, and time dummies.  
 
 
The results in Table 4 show that the coefficient for HBIAS is still negative and statistically 
significant. Although the magnitude of transaction cost coefficients is somewhat reduced, 
they remain statistically significant. The changes in magnitude of the coefficients of 
transaction cost measures are not surprising since inclusion of the control variables and time 
dummies mitigates any bias inherent in regression (13). 
 
(Insert Table “4” here) 
    
   Next we run a number of different specifications of the model to ensure that our estimates 
are robust. The outputs of different specifications of the model are shown in Table 5. We first 
discuss the results of the transaction cost measures followed by the discussion about the 
impact of control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
(14)  
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4.3. All in one  
As multicollinearity amongst the different transaction cost measures is not a significant 
problem, we include all four transaction cost variables in a single regression and jointly 
estimate their significance via the following regression: 
 
 
The findings reported in Table 5 (specification 15) show that not only are the coefficients 
for transaction cost measures highly significant, but they also carry expected signs. Also the 
model yields an improved R
2
 of 83%. This suggests that each transaction cost measure has a 
distinct and statistically significant influence on foreign portfolio allocations. 
 
(Insert Table “5” here) 
 
4.4. Free float home bias 
As discussed earlier, the home bias (HBIAS) variable that we use is based on the 
assumptions that all countries follow an open market policy allowing free entry and exit of 
foreign investors. However, despite vigorously pursuing the liberalization of financial 
markets, many emerging markets in developing countries have regulations that impede the 
free inflow and outflow of portfolio investments. In order to address this issue we include two 
additional variables which could potentially control for this deficiency. The first is the equity 
market openness and the second is the extent of the existence of closely held firms. In order 
to further substantiate the issue of free float securities, we construct a free float HBIAS 
measure using the S&P IFC’s freely investable market value index. However, a caveat is 
worth noting here. The HBIAS measure is only available for the markets in developing 
 (15)  
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countries and therefore in our analysis we assume that developed markets are completely 
open for foreign investors. However, even if this is not the case for some developed 
countries, the closely held variable included in our model should be able to capture the effects 
of investment restrictions, if any. We run the regression specified in equation (16) with a 
freely floated home bias (F_HBIAS) variable. The regression outputs are reported in Table 5 
(Specification 16). 
 
 
Results suggest that the magnitude of the F_HBIAS coefficient is slightly lower than in 
specification 15. However, it is still statistically significant. The transaction cost coefficients 
remain highly significant without any material change in their estimated coefficients except 
for liquidity measure (TC4). 
 
4.5. Unit specific effect and reverse causality 
Our regression coefficients may still be suspected of bias, since it is possible that each 
country may have its individual effect through the time invariant variables, and also due to 
time invariant pair country bilateral effects, such as common colonization history, special 
bilateral treaty, favourite partner nation status, etc. If this is the case then the unobserved time 
invariant variables may be correlated with the regressors and the estimates may be biased. 
We use the fixed effect model to address this issue. As discussed earlier, that although the 
fixed effect model is not as efficient as the random effect model, it does account for all 
country specific and bilateral cross-country time invariant effects. As our transaction cost and 
most of the other control variables have a time dimension, we are able to employ the fixed 
 
 
 
(16)  
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effect model using only the time variant variables. We run regression specification 17 using a 
fixed effect model.  
 
 
The results reported in Table 5 (Specification 17) show that the explanatory power of the 
model is somewhat reduced since all time invariant variables are not used. However, the 
reported goodness-of-fit of the fixed effect model is explained by the ‘within transformation’ 
of the independent variables and cannot be interpreted in the usual way (see Wooldridge, 
2003). All key variables, i.e., commission, fees, and market impact cost variables, remain 
statistically significant without any major change in either their statistical significance or 
signs.  
 
In our regressions, reverse causality may also be a potential problem. To overcome this, 
we use one year lagged value of all four transaction cost measures in regression 18.  
 
 
As can be observed from the estimates in Table 5 (Specification 18), the regression 
coefficients of the lagged values of transaction costs remain statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the estimates does change as they reflect the lagged effect rather than the level. 
However, despite using lagged values, the transaction cost measures remain statistically 
significant, confirming that the transaction cost variables used in our estimations do not 
appear to suffer from reverse causality problems.  
 
 (17)  
 (18)  
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4.6. Major financial centres 
We consider the possibility of international investors buying depositary receipts listed in 
major financial centres instead of investing directly in shares trading in the foreign equity 
markets. International investors may be tempted to use major financial centres because of the 
lower transaction costs (Aggarwal et al. 2007). If this is the case then our transaction cost 
estimates may be affected because our sample includes US, UK and Japan which are major 
financial centres where depositary receipts are listed and actively traded. In order to address 
this issue, we exclude US, UK and Japan as investor countries from the sample and run the 
following specification (19).  
 
 
As seen in Table 5 (Specification 19), despite excluding US, UK and Japan, the 
coefficients of all transaction cost measures remain highly significant. This confirms that 
even after removing the effects of the major financial centres, transaction costs do seem to 
matter in the international portfolio allocations. 
 
4.7. Practical significance 
In order to explain the practical importance of transaction costs in attracting international 
portfolio investments, we generate a dummy for an arbitrarily chosen country, Portugal, and 
examine its interaction with commission cost (TC1) via the following specification: 
 
 
 
 
 
(19)  
 (20)  
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The regression results in Table 5 (Specification 20) show that the coefficient of TC1 for 
Portugal is -5.47 [i.e. (-0.89) + (-4.58)]. This indicates that on average a 1% decrease in 
transaction cost could lead to a 5.47% increase in Portugal’s weightings in the international 
portfolio. This illustrates that the estimated effects of transaction costs demonstrated in this 
paper are not trivial. 
 
4.8. Nominal effective exchange rate 
As discussed earlier, we also test the model by including a volatility measure based on the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) obtained from BIS and run the following 
specification.  
 
 
As shown in Table 5 (specification 21) the coefficients of transaction costs remain 
statistically significant. This indicates that the effect of transaction costs on portfolio 
allocations remains unchanged irrespective of the choice of exchange rate volatility measure. 
 
4.9. Investor country’s perspective  
Hitherto the specifications used have included all investor countries’ bilateral foreign 
equity portfolio holdings data. In specification 22, we examine year by year regression for 
each investor country. Since we run 96 regressions (16 countries × six years), it is practically 
not feasible to report all 384 coefficients (96 × four transaction cost measures). Instead we 
provide a summary of regression results in table 6 which shows the number of countries for 
which we find TC1-TC4 significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
13
 
                                                 
13
 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
 (21)  
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The results in Table 6 show that out of the total number of regressions, TC1 is highly 
significant in 98% cases, TC2 in 79%, TC3 in 90% and TC4 in 88% cases. We relate this 
result to our univariate analysis. The lower percentage of cases for TC2 may be attributed to 
its relatively lower share in the total transaction costs. TC1 (commission) and TC3 (market 
impact) constitute more than 90% of the trading costs for all countries, except for the UK, 
Philippines, Taiwan and Greece. This suggests that even from an individual investor 
country’s perspective, transaction costs remain a very important factor for international 
investments.  
 
(Insert Table “6” here) 
 
4.10. Control variables 
Most of the control variables have expected and consistent signs in the different 
specifications except for GDP growth and country risk. As seen from the reported statistics in 
Table 6, both investor protection measures are significant and bear expected signs 
consistently in all regressions. The GDP growth, although significant in most cases, is not 
consistent in terms of expected signs which may suggest that investors may be more 
concerned with the level of economic development captured by GDP per capita which is 
highly significant and generally consistent across all specifications in terms of its expected 
signs. Further, Equity market openness and Closely held firm variables are also significant 
and carry the expected signs indicating that investors tend to underweight those countries 
which have high restrictions on foreign investment and where ownership is not dispersed.  
 
 (22)  
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As far as the three equity market related variables, i.e., Stock market development, Equity 
market volatility and Exchange rate volatility are concerned, they carry expected signs and 
are highly significant across all specifications, except specification 18 where equity market 
volatility is insignificant. The results make sense since they indicate that foreign investors are 
keen to invest in countries where stock markets are large, volatility of equity returns is lower 
and where there is less uncertainty with regard to exchange rates. Following Ross’s (1989) 
model, the significance of cross-sectional standard deviation (equity market volatility) 
illustrates that investors prefer countries with a well developed market microstructure and 
where the rate of information flow and industrial diversity of the equity market are high.  
 
As expected, the Emerging market dummy coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant in all specifications confirming that stock market development is indeed a key 
factor influencing the international portfolio allocations. Bilateral trade too is highly 
significant in all regressions. Good trade relations between countries seem to positively 
influence the international portfolio investments. This is also consistent with evidence 
provided by Chan et al. (2005) who report that bilateral trade plays a significant part in 
portfolio allocation choice. Finally, we find the coefficients on common language, distance 
historical return and equity return correlation to be consistent and carrying expected signs. 
We find that the broad measure of country risk either changes signs or becomes insignificant 
under different specifications. Similar results of the insignificance or inconsistencies of some 
of the control variables are also reported by previous studies when modelling foreign 
portfolio investments (see Gelos and Wei, 2005).  
 
Overall, the dominance of the market specific variables such as stock market development, 
equity market volatility, exchange rate volatility, emerging market dummy and bilateral 
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information asymmetry variables shows that investors prefer to invest in markets which are 
well developed and have lower transactions costs. 
 
4.11. Relative measure of transaction cost and volatility measures 
We further discuss the importance of our transaction cost measures relative to volatility 
measures. We follow two methods to identify the relative importance. Following Gelos and 
Wei (2005), the first method we use is to study the relative size of adjusted R
2
. We run two 
regressions. In the first regression, we include only four transaction cost proxies and in the 
second, we include only volatility measures. The results in Table 7 show that the adjusted R
2
 
of the first regression is 45% and 7% for the second regression. The results confirm that 
transaction cost measures are more important compared to volatility measures.  
 
In order to ensure the robustness of the results reported in Panel A, we run an OLS 
regression (23), where  are the volatility measures. 
 
 
We report the standardized beta (ranked highest to lowest) of the transaction cost and 
volatility measures in panel 2 of Table 7. Once again standardized betas for all four 
transaction cost measures are much larger relative to the volatility measures. 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
In spite of the critical role of transaction cost, there is relatively much less research on its 
influence on international equity portfolio investment decisions. In this study, we use hand 
collected data on different components of transaction cost (commission, fees and market 
 (23)  
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impact) and country by country portfolio investment holdings for 36 countries over the 2001-
2006 period and examine whether portfolio allocation choices are influenced by levels of 
transaction costs. 
 
Using the random and fixed effect models, and after controlling for a host of other 
variables including a measure that captures the home bias effect, we find a robust and 
significant impact of transaction cost on international equity portfolio investments. The 
results show that the three direct measures of transaction cost and in particular commission 
and market impact, which make up a significant proportion of transaction cost in most 
countries, have a distinct and statistically significant impact on investment allocation choices. 
The findings show that countries with lower transaction costs seem to attract greater foreign 
equity portfolio investments.  
 
There are two important implications of our results. First, future research on international 
portfolio diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction cost in country 
allocation decisions. Second, policy makers, especially in developing countries, should 
implement measures to reduce transaction costs in order to attract higher levels of foreign 
equity portfolio investments.  
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Table 1 
Statistics on foreign portfolio weights and transaction cost measures. 
 Country 
Portfolio 
allocation 
Commission Fees 
Market 
Impact 
Total 
Cost 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Argentina 0.0005 32.77 3.12 37.67 73.56 10.67 
Australia 0.0146 23.13 2.08 8.85 34.06 76.70 
Austria 0.0045 17.43 0.43 12.78 30.63 76.70 
Belgium 0.0108 18.49 0.38 10.47 29.34 25.13 
Brazil 0.0054 26.41 1.92 17.66 45.99 35.50 
Canada 0.0171 18.78 0.51 13.05 32.35 66.50 
Chile 0.0004 41.80 8.03 23.60 73.43 11.68 
China 0.0041 NA NA NA NA 88.30 
Czech Republic 0.0009 41.39 6.57 10.09 58.05 68.27 
Denmark 0.0056 19.38 0.22 15.92 35.52 75.23 
Finland 0.0210 18.20 0.75 24.21 43.16 116.67 
France 0.1081 17.90 0.64 9.44 27.98 83.83 
Germany 0.0882 17.88 0.62 9.02 27.53 131.00 
Greece 0.0028 31.77 15.35 12.45 59.57 40.17 
Hungary 0.0020 42.36 4.99 11.17 57.96 63.35 
India 0.0031 41.38 2.88 18.65 62.92 133.07 
Indonesia 0.0101 45.53 10.80 15.96 72.29 43.82 
Italy 0.0343 18.00 0.58 12.78 31.36 120.50 
Japan 0.0794 13.53 0.20 6.42 20.15 97.50 
Korea 0.0107 30.01 13.19 16.40 59.61 247.97 
Malaysia 0.0015 34.75 6.63 15.49 56.87 27.87 
Mexico 0.0042 27.30 0.27 10.48 38.04 26.52 
New Zealand 0.0015 22.49 0.24 14.85 37.58 41.83 
Norway 0.0057 19.00 0.25 13.26 32.51 103.17 
Peru 0.0002 36.46 8.01 22.07 66.54 7.50 
Philippines 0.0004 47.83 30.13 12.25 90.20 13.03 
Poland 0.0017 NA NA NA NA 31.83 
Portugal 0.0027 18.53 0.67 14.74 33.94 50.83 
Russia 0.0058 NA NA NA NA 45.98 
Sweden 0.0209 18.33 0.47 12.29 31.10 117.33 
Switzerland 0.0533 17.74 0.95 10.42 29.11 93.00 
Taiwan 0.0058 25.85 13.04 14.69 53.58 181.62 
Thailand 0.0018 43.27 1.79 13.26 58.33 100.98 
Turkey 0.0019 33.66 2.80 20.61 56.51 45.00 
UK 0.1573 14.40 24.77 14.14 53.31 112.83 
US 0.3776 15.47 0.41 9.19 25.07 160.50 
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Table 2 
Correlation among different transaction measures. 
  TC1 TC2 TC3 TC4 
     
TC1 1.00    
TC2 0.40 1.00   
TC3 0.20 0.05 1.00  
TC4 -0.29           -0.06 -0.13 1.00 
          
 
 
 
Table 3 
Base model regression. 
In all regressions the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign 
portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The independent variables are 
home bias (HBIAS) and the four measures of transaction cost in basis points (scaled by 100). 
TC1 denotes commission, TC2 fees, TC3 market impact and TC4 average turnover ratio. 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error allowing for clustering 
within the bilateral asset allocation). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity.  
 
 TC1 TC2 TC3 TC4 
HBIAS -0.926*** -0.931*** -0.937*** -0.938*** 
 (-60.50) (-59.95) (-61.14) (-64.50) 
     
Transaction Cost -2.864*** -0.664** -0.639*** 13.19*** 
 (-14.74) (-2.46) (-7.51) (3.90) 
     
Overall adjusted R
2
  0.46 0.30 0.30 0.32 
Number of Observations 3011 3011 3011 3290 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4 
Regression with all control variables and time dummies. 
In all regressions the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign 
portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The independent variables are 
home bias (HBIAS), the four measures of transaction costs in basis points (scaled by 100), all 
control variables and time dummies. TC1 denotes commission, TC2 fees, TC3 market impact 
and TC4 average turnover ratio. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust 
standard error allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation). All the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. 
 
 TC1 TC2 TC3 TC4 
HBIAS -0.926*** -0.925*** -0.930*** -0.922*** 
 (-95.48) (-93.89) (-95.86) (-102.60) 
     
Transaction Cost -0.689*** -0.978*** -0.407*** 2.770* 
 (-6.06) (-5.17) (-4.02) (1.82) 
     
Investor Protection 4.218*** 4.611*** 2.885*** 5.143*** 
 (4.87) (5.24) (3.43) (6.10) 
     
Legal Dummy 0.460*** 0.477*** 0.442*** 0.311*** 
 (5.73) (5.48) (5.56) (3.64) 
     
GDP Per Capita 0.514*** 0.587*** 0.515*** 0.445*** 
 (9.11) (9.82) (9.63) (7.39) 
     
GDP Growth 0.867*** 0.761** 0.237 0.494 
 (2.70) (2.37) (0.83) (1.54) 
     
Equity Market Openness 1.236*** 1.357*** 1.298*** 0.716*** 
 (9.06) (10.06) (8.81) (6.52) 
     
Closely Held Firm -2.714*** -2.743*** -2.760*** -2.590*** 
 (-12.92) (-12.59) (-13.94) (-12.62) 
     
Stock Market Development 0.603*** 0.624*** 0.639*** 0.601*** 
 (23.67) (23.38) (27.83) (24.09) 
     
Equity Market Volatility -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.127*** -0.153*** 
 (-5.91) (-5.94) (-4.89) (-6.92) 
     
Exchange Rate Volatility -2.358*** -2.119*** -2.152*** -2.305*** 
 (-7.33) (-6.40) (-6.54) (-7.12) 
     
Emerging Market Dummy -0.549*** -0.459*** -0.643*** -0.845*** 
 (-3.52) (-2.78) (-4.52) (-5.56) 
     
Common Language Dummy 0.426*** 0.453*** 0.415*** 0.374*** 
 (5.53) (5.41) (5.50) (4.54) 
     
Bilateral Trade 2.365*** 2.279*** 2.405*** 2.465*** 
 (12.75) (12.28) (13.03) (13.59) 
     
Distance -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.183*** -0.188*** 
 (-4.45) (-4.44) (-4.64) (-4.55) 
     
Equity Return Correlation -1.152*** -1.240*** -1.138*** -1.575*** 
 (-4.44) (-4.59) (-4.76) (-6.29) 
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Table 4, Continued     
     
Historical Return 0.315*** 0.303*** 0.299*** 0.326*** 
 (7.76) (6.96) (7.20) (7.78) 
     
Country Risk -0.199 -0.155 -0.342** -0.0448 
 (-1.35) (-1.02) (-2.32) (-0.27) 
     
Year 1 Dummy 0.167*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 
 (6.37) (5.76) (5.36) (5.15) 
     
Year 2 Dummy 0.332*** 0.313*** 0.329*** 0.296*** 
 (14.12) (14.13) (13.87) (13.89) 
     
Year 3 Dummy 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.128*** 
 (9.13) (9.40) (8.91) (8.29) 
     
Year 4 Dummy 0.0556*** 0.0573*** 0.0607*** 0.0428*** 
 (4.54) (4.74) (4.95) (3.51) 
     
Year 5 Dummy 0.0113 0.00526 0.0198 0.000974 
 (0.91) (0.42) (1.48) (0.08) 
     
Overall adjusted R
2  0.80 0.79 0.80 0.79 
Number of observations 2915 2915 2915 3101 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 5 
Regression output with different specifications. 
In all regressions the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t 
(wi,j,t). The independent variables are home bias (HBIAS), the four measures of transaction costs in basis points (scaled by 100), control variables 
and time dummies. TC1 denote commission, TC2 fees, TC3 market impact and TC4 average turnover ratio.  
Specification 15 includes transaction cost, control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification 16 includes free flow home bias, transaction cost, all control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification 17 includes home bias, transaction costs, all time variant control variables, time dummies and uses fixed effect model. 
Specification 18 includes home bias, lagged transaction costs, all control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification 19 includes home bias, transaction costs, all control variables, time dummies and uses the random effect model but the sample 
excludes US, UK and Japan as investor countries to address the effect of major financial centres. 
Specification 20 includes home bias, transaction costs, all control variables, Portugal dummy interacted with TC1, time dummies and uses the 
random effect model. 
Specification 21 includes home bias, transaction costs, all control variables, employs the random effect model but uses a nominal effective 
exchange rate instead of REER as the exchange rate volatility measure. 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation). All the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticity.  
 
 Specification  
15 
Specification  
16 
Specification  
17 
Specification  
18 
Specification  
19 
Specification  
20 
Specification  
21 
HBIAS -0.927*** -0.826*** -0.921*** -0.963*** -0.933*** -0.928*** -0.926*** 
 (-95.59) (-67.76) (-83.28) (-103.85) (-89.14) (-94.49) (-95.51) 
        
TC1 -0.808*** -0.809*** -0.283** -0.795*** -0.817*** -0.893*** -0.783*** 
 (-6.46) (-5.36) (-2.23) (-7.75) (-5.81) (-6.82) (-6.28) 
        
TC2 -1.026*** -1.081*** -1.136*** -0.919*** -1.018*** -1.038*** -1.013*** 
 (-4.99) (-4.70) (-5.18) (-5.09) (-4.42) (-5.07) (-4.96) 
        
TC3 -0.519*** -0.426*** -0.459*** -0.179** -0.498*** -0.553*** -0.523*** 
 (-5.08) (-3.50) (-4.16) (-2.48) (-4.36) (-5.30) (-5.12) 
        
TC4 5.004*** 3.291 7.756*** 5.285*** 4.980*** 5.776*** 4.908*** 
 (3.02) (1.45) (4.54) (3.25) (2.73) (3.29) (2.95) 
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Table 5, continued        
        
Investor Protection 2.848*** 0.844 1.977*** 2.372*** -0.733 2.758*** 2.260*** 
 (3.41) (0.79) (2.99) (3.48) (-0.61) (3.25) (2.66) 
        
        
Legal Dummy 0.354*** 0.603*** NA 0.481*** 0.310*** 0.262*** 0.357*** 
 (4.98) (5.94)  (6.73) (3.87) (3.98) (5.01) 
        
GDP Per Capita 0.319*** 0.385*** 2.722*** 0.228*** 0.324*** 0.183*** 0.330*** 
 (6.61) (5.85) (13.90) (4.68) (6.06) (4.00) (6.85) 
        
GDP Growth 0.583* 1.002*** -0.849*** 2.359*** 0.531 0.805** 0.499* 
 (1.93) (2.75) (-3.01) (6.67) (1.57) (2.56) (1.65) 
        
Equity Market Openness 1.472*** 1.696*** 0.968*** 2.474*** 1.563*** 1.591*** 1.435*** 
 (10.28) (9.85) (5.02) (17.01) (9.70) (10.95) (9.98) 
        
Closely Held Firm -2.638*** -3.017*** NA -2.959*** -2.658*** -2.760*** -2.652*** 
 (-14.55) (-11.74)  (-16.39) (-13.01) (-16.40) (-14.59) 
        
Stock Market Development 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.654*** 0.545*** 0.682*** 0.698*** 0.696*** 
 (29.44) (23.19) (22.62) (22.77) (25.89) (29.54) (29.58) 
        
Equity Market Volatility -0.165*** -0.183*** -0.128*** -0.0119 -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.162*** 
 (-6.10) (-6.17) (-4.44) (-0.67) (-5.52) (-5.93) (-5.98) 
        
Exchange Rate Volatility -2.237*** -1.808*** -1.620*** -2.230*** -2.192*** -2.303*** -2.025*** 
 (-6.80) (-5.01) (-7.80) (-7.92) (-5.96) (-6.85) (-6.68) 
        
Emerging Market Dummy -0.745*** -0.662*** NA -0.957*** -0.789*** -1.007*** -0.741*** 
 (-6.07) (-4.11)  (-7.92) (-5.61) (-8.95) (-6.04) 
        
Common Language Dummy 0.416*** 0.270*** NA 0.483*** 0.437*** 0.373*** 0.417*** 
 (6.02) (2.72)  (6.70) (5.80) (5.74) (6.02) 
        
Bilateral Trade 2.586*** 3.202*** 1.271*** 2.529*** 2.325*** 2.685*** 2.594*** 
 (15.05) (22.37) (6.20) (18.18) (11.00) (16.75) (14.97) 
        
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
42 
 
Table 5, continued        
        
Distance -0.167*** -0.123*** NA -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.155*** -0.169*** 
 (-4.93) (-2.78)  (-5.69) (-4.84) (-5.05) (-4.96) 
        
Equity Return Correlation -1.027*** -1.217*** NA -1.067*** -1.234*** -0.970*** -1.033*** 
 (-4.85) (-4.72)  (-4.93) (-4.96) (-5.03) (-4.86) 
        
Historical Return 0.257*** 0.311*** 0.261*** 0.0331 0.265*** 0.242*** 0.269*** 
 (6.33) (6.19) (7.62) (0.90) (5.85) (5.86) (6.71) 
        
Country Risk -0.361** -0.272 -0.419** 0.409** -0.297 -0.499*** -0.381** 
 (-2.15) (-1.30) (-2.39) (2.41) (-1.62) (-2.83) (-2.24) 
        
Portugal_TC1 NA NA NA NA NA -4.576*** NA 
      (-12.22)  
        
Year 1 Dummy 0.225*** 0.460*** 0.321*** 0.309*** 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.228*** 
 (8.11) (14.59) (10.62) (7.41) (7.30) (8.42) (8.22) 
        
Year 2 Dummy 0.394*** 0.562*** 0.478*** 0.221*** 0.402*** 0.396*** 0.400*** 
 (15.60) (18.46) (18.78) (11.53) (13.94) (15.31) (15.83) 
        
Year 3 Dummy 0.200*** 0.322*** 0.288*** 0.0920*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.203*** 
 (10.94) (14.64) (14.96) (6.57) (9.86) (10.76) (11.12) 
        
Year 4 Dummy 0.0973*** 0.194*** 0.174*** 0.0340*** 0.0989*** 0.100*** 0.0987*** 
 (7.70) (11.63) (10.27) (3.06) (6.98) (7.78) (7.74) 
        
Year 5 Dummy 0.0540*** 0.103*** 0.0870*** 0.0283** 0.0514*** 0.0589*** 0.0538*** 
 (3.85) (5.71) (6.65) (2.44) (3.31) (4.05) (3.87) 
Overall adjusted R
2
 0.83 0.68 0.54 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.82 
Number of observations 2915 2910 2915 2390 2368 2915 2915 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table 6 
Each investor country and each year cross-sectional regressions. 
In all regressions the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j. The 
independent variables are home bias (HBIAS) and the four measures of transaction costs in basis points (scaled by 100). TC1 denotes 
commission, TC2 fees, TC3 market impact and TC4 average turnover ratio. Each regression represents one investor country and 35 recipient 
countries for each year totalling 96 regressions for the period of 6 years. Significant coefficients of transaction cost measures are reported in 
numbers at 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance levels.  
 
 
TC1 
 
TC2 
 
TC3 
 
TC4 
Investor countries 1% 5% 10% Total 
 
1% 5% 10% Total 
 
1% 5% 10% Total 
 
1% 5% 10% Total 
Australia 4 2 
 
6 
 
2 2 
 
4 
 
2 2 1 5 
  
4 2 6 
Austria 5 1 
 
6 
 
1 1 4 6 
 
1 1 2 4 
 
1 3 2 6 
Belgium 6 
  
6 
  
2 2 4 
 
1 1 3 5 
 
1 2 2 5 
Canada 4 2 
 
6 
 
3 1 1 5 
 
3 1 
 
4 
 
3 1 1 5 
Denmark 6 
  
6 
 
2 1 2 5 
 
2 2 
 
4 
 
2 1 2 5 
France 6 
  
6 
 
2 3 1 6 
 
1 1 3 5 
  
2 4 6 
Germany 6 
  
6 
 
1 2 2 5 
 
4 1 1 6 
 
1 3 ` 4 
Ireland 5 1 
 
6 
 
2 2 
 
4 
 
2 1 3 6 
 
4 
 
2 6 
Italy 6 
  
6 
 
1 1 2 4 
 
2 1 3 6 
 
4 
 
2 6 
Japan 6 
  
6 
 
2 1 1 4 
 
3 2 1 6 
 
2 
 
1 3 
Netherlands 3 2 
 
5 
 
2 2 1 5 
 
3 3 
 
6 
 
3 
 
2 5 
Norway 6 
  
6 
 
1 2 1 4 
 
3 2 1 6 
 
3 1 2 6 
Sweden 6 
  
6 
 
3 1 1 5 
 
3 1 2 6 
 
1 2 2 5 
Switzerland 3 2 
 
5 
 
1 2 2 5 
 
2 4 
 
6 
 
3 
 
2 5 
United Kingdom 5 
 
1 6 
 
1 3 
 
4 
 
3 2 1 6 
 
2 4 
 
6 
United States 6 
  
6 
 
5 1 
 
6 
 
4 2 
 
6 
 
4 1   5 
Total number of significant 
coefficients 83 10 1 94 
 
29 27 20 76 
 
39 27 21 87 
 
34 24 26 84 
Percentage of significant 
coefficients relative to 96 
 
 
                   regressions 
   
98%   
   
79%   
   
91%   
   
88% 
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Table 7 
Relative importance of trading cost and volatility measures. 
For regression outputs of both tables (panels A and B), the dependent variable is the log value 
of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t 
(wi,j,t). The independent variables in the first regression of Panel A (Transaction cost 
measures) include the four measures of transaction costs in basis points (scaled by 100) and 
the second regression includes the two volatility measures (equity market volatility and 
exchange rate volatility) For panel A test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust 
standard error allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation). All the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Panel B presents standardized beta metrics. 
 
Panel A: R
2
 based metric 
 Transaction cost measures Volatility measures 
TC1 -4.202***  
 (-16.84)  
   
TC2 -1.791***  
 (-4.04)  
   
TC3 -0.497***  
 (-3.12)  
   
TC4 7.441***  
 (5.66)  
Equity market volatility  -0.0724** 
  (-2.15) 
   
Exchange rate volatility  -5.069*** 
  (-10.86) 
Adjusted overall R
2
 0.45 0.07 
Number of observations 3009 3288 
 
Panel B: Standardized beta based metric 
Variables Standardized Beta 
TC4 0.2091 
TC1 0.1799 
TC3 0.1774 
TC2 0.0229 
Equity market volatility 0.0109 
Exchange rate volatility 0.0047 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
